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THESIS ABSTRACT 
 
Matthew Jacobs 
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Title: Communal Agency in Josiah Royce 
 
  
 On the common sense view, an agent is an individual.  Communities are collections 
of individuals, but the community itself is not understood to possess a collective, unified 
agency.  Nevertheless, this view stands at odds with frequent ascriptions of communal 
agency; e.g., “Oregonians are environmentally conscious,” “The team played to win,” 
“The LGBTQ community is pro-gay marriage.”  If we are to vindicate such ascriptions, 
we need a theory of the “reality of community,” the thesis that under certain conditions, a 
community possesses a unified, collective agency.  This work reconstructs Royce’s 
theory of communal agency through his views of purposiveness and the use he makes of 
C.S. Peirce’s “theory of interpretation.” I argue that, for Royce, agency is purposiveness 
and purposiveness always bears the triadic structure of the process of interpretation.  
Thus, the process of interpretation entails agency whether at the level of the individual or 
at the level of the community. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Communities of Individuals 
 In response to the recent financial crisis, there was significant public outcry made 
in favor of punitive measures for investment banks that engaged in subprime lending.  It 
was, after all, the practices and transactions carried out by these banks that caused a great 
deal of current economic duress, so they must deserve some form of reprimand.  This 
outcry faced the obvious objection that not all the individuals working for these agencies 
knew the details or ethically questionable nature of the lending taking place, and that, 
given this ignorance, punitive measures that applied to entire agencies would end up 
punishing innocent and guilty individuals alike.  This led to discussions of how to discern 
which individuals were involved with subprime trading and how to distinguish them from 
those who were not. In the face of the organizational complexity of the agencies involved 
and the impossibility of identifying the responsible individuals, the task of separating 
guilty from innocent seemed impossible and the cry for punishment eventually dissipated. 
The ambiguity underlying the question of responsibility in this case is one that 
stems from a tension in our understanding of the relation between individuals and 
communities.  From an early age we understand that agents are individuals.  (This is why 
the criterion for just punishment in the case of investment banks is identifying precisely 
which individuals are guilty.) Communities, then, amount to collections of individuals, 
but are not collective agents themselves. And yet, we also attribute things like beliefs and 
actions to communities, suggesting a commitment to communities possessing a kind of 
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corporate will: “My family wants to move to New York.” “The team played to win.” 
“Venezuela supports nationalized oil.” “Europe is feeling the effects of the economic 
crisis.” “The LGBTQ movement supports gay marriage.” Being committed to 
individuality as the only real form of agency, the slightest moment’s pause forces us to 
admit the likelihood that not all family members want to move to New York, that not all 
Venezuelans want nationalized oil, etc. But then why do speak of communities in this 
way?  Our belief in communal agency stands in need of clarification. 
A brief glance at contemporary “collective intentionality” literature is highly 
instructive.  Adopting what is known as the “summative” approach,1 we could say that 
“Such and such a group believes X if and only if most of its members believe that X.”  
But the easy limit case of 51% reveals this to be an unsatisfactory account.  Describing an 
election where Candidate Jones wins with 51% of the vote, we would deem “The people 
support Candidate Jones” to be an exaggeration and perhaps even inaccurate.  Non-
summative approaches avoid such limit cases by arguing that communal agency should 
be understood in terms of “joint” or “shared” commitment.2  Joint or shared commitment 
is the holding of some belief, on the part of individuals of a collective, where the belief 
involves explicit recognition of the belief as collective.  For example, John and Paul hold 
a joint commitment to painting a house if and only if John believes that ‘John and Paul 
will both paint the house’ and Paul believes that ‘John and Paul will both paint the 
house.’  But this approach does not weather cases of error.  Since the formation of joint 
commitment depends on the explicit and correct recognition of others’ commitments, 
John cannot be said to form a joint commitment if he is mistaken in what Paul is 
committed to. Likewise, Paul cannot form a joint commitment if John is mistaken since 
 3 
there is no other to share the commitment with.  Most importantly, both summative and 
non-summative approaches focus their efforts on the details of how individuals’ beliefs 
intersect; they do not question that individuals are the only real agents, and so they 
remain at some remove from the possibility of offering an account of communities as 
collective agents. 
John Dewey offers us an appealing alternative, one that escapes the ensnaring 
focus on beliefs of individual agents. Dewey’s strategy centers on the concrete situations 
to which groups of people respond. Dewey calls such groups “publics,” defining them not 
merely as social collections, but as social bodies comprised of “all those who are affected 
by the indirect consequences of transactions to such an extent that it is deemed necessary 
to have those consequences systematically cared for.”3 All those affected by the 
consequences of some particular transaction (for example, those who will suffer based on 
ill-conceived legislation concerning water rights) form a public, a group that is united in 
its efforts to respond to a phenomenon bearing on all of them.  This definition of 
collective agency sounds promising, for we have moved beyond talk of what particular 
individuals believe or do and reached a discussion of what a collective does.  But if we 
pursue this account, we find that even a public is a collection of individuals. For Dewey, 
there is no 
mysterious collective agency…making decisions, but…some few persons who 
know what they are about… When the public or state is involved in making social 
arrangements like passing laws, enforcing a contract, conferring a franchise, it 
still acts through concrete persons. The persons are now officers, representatives 
of a public interest.4 
 
Even the public interest represented here is not a collective agent, but the views of 
individuals who take into consideration the effects of some given solution on others.5  
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Thus, even in responding to a common problem, the individuals who comprise a public 
still remain individuals. 
  There are, of course, variations on the themes of joint belief or the Deweyan 
picture of a collective response to a shared problem, but in most cases, it is still beliefs 
held by individuals or the responses of individuals to a problem that shoulder the 
explanatory burden of collective agency.6  It would seem that if we are to ascribe unity to 
community, we need a theory of community that argues for the reality of community, a 
theory under which a community possesses a unified agency that is not reducible to the 
wills of its members.  
 
Josiah Royce and the Reality of Community 
 For such a theory we turn to the work of Josiah Royce, a philosopher who 
claimed, “I strongly feel that my deepest motives and problems have centered about the 
idea of the Community…”7  Royce devoted enormous efforts to developing a theory of 
community and to showing its relevance to truth, ethics, metaphysics, and religion.  The 
commitment to the reality of community was so deeply embedded in his philosophy that 
he summarized his metaphysical position as the thesis that the universe is of the nature of 
a community,8 and averred that unless community is real, in the sense of a collective 
agency not reducible to the wills of its members, “there is no real world.”9  Royce’s 
theory of collective or communal agency has never been an explicit object of study, and 
as we shall see, this has ultimately led to misunderstandings of Royce’s thought as it 
surrounds the issue.  Nevertheless, the idea that communities are agents is so central for 
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Royce that communal agency has not gone totally ignored, and a view of previous 
treatments of the theme suggests a helpful starting point for our investigation here.   
Scholars often end up discussing communal agency in Royce when tracking 
Royce’s emphasis on the similarities rather than the differences between individuals and 
communities.  One recurrent form of this emphasis surrounds what Royce calls the “time-
process.”  In Kegley’s words,  
A community has a past and will have a future. It has a more or less conscious 
history, real or ideal, and this history is a part of its very essence. To maintain 
community consciousness it must foster and maintain memory of key events, 
significant objects, important actions, and goals, values and ideals. This is true, of 
course, also for the individual self.10 
 
In fact, Kegley argues, “The community is a person by the same criteria that identify the 
life of the human self…The self is essentially a temporal, meaningful, time-process. 
Likewise, a genuine community for Royce is both a community of memory and 
community of hope.”11  John E. Smith, in a passage drawing out more explicitly the form 
of this temporal, meaningful process affirms precisely these parallels between individuals 
and communities: 
Royce offered an interesting analogy which makes the significance of the time 
process striking. His analogy is between the individual self and any form of 
corporate life…The self of the present is linked to the past in memory, and is also 
aware that whatever the past is, it is the past of just that self. It is in this 
continuity, said Royce, that is to be found, in part, the identify of the self… Both 
from the standpoint of a given self and of certain others who come in contact with 
that self, interpretation is a necessary condition of there being a self at all in any 
significant sense. [In the case of individuals,] the individual interprets his past to 
his future self, and [in the case of communities] the other selves judge an 
individual’s present activities in the light of his past deeds and experiences. In 
either case the self is the result of interpretation.12 
    
A second commonly emphasized theme pertaining to communal agency is that agency, 
for Royce, involves purposiveness.  As Smith tells us, agency for Royce is not best 
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described in terms of faculties like reason or the will, but rather, like other pragmatists, 
with reliance on the thesis that “all thought is operative in a concrete context wider than 
itself and that it is controlled by purposes which both guide it and give it point.”13 Indeed, 
Smith summarizes, an agent for Royce is essentially “a purpose, a life plan, a meaning.”14 
Kegley’s portrait of Royce’s thought echoes this picture: “Communities have causes and 
plans that unify them as ‘persons,’ just as a plan unifies individual selves.”15  
It has been made clear that agency for Royce, on both the level of individuals and 
the level of communities, involves a temporally extended process (called “the process of 
interpretation”) and that this process structures both individuals’ and communities’ 
possession of past, present, and future selves. It has also been shown that for Royce, part 
of what it means to be an agent, individual or communal, is to be a kind of purposive 
striving, to be something that holds a plan of action.  The connections between these two 
themes has not gone unnoticed. Smith points out that Royce understood the process of 
interpretation as the “expression of a purpose.”16  And this picture of communal agency 
seem promising, for in contrast to the summative, non-summative, and Deweyan 
approaches we first saw, a Roycean theory of communal agency is interested in how a 
community carries out some purpose as a whole as well as how the community as a 
whole has a common history and future that retains continuity across time.  Nevertheless, 
there are problems with how these various elements of agency in Royce have been 
articulated.   
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The Dependency Argument  
 Kegley and Smith frequently emphasize the interdependent nature of individuals 
and communities in their work surrounding the reality of community for Royce. The 
“dependency argument” begins with the claim that the self is an ethical project for Royce. 
On Smith’s reading, Royce’s doctrine of the self “is essentially an ethical 
conception…and the uniqueness of the self as an induplicable individual, derive[s] from 
the self’s place in the moral order [of which that self is a member.]”17 Kegley words the 
same point by insisting that the very “realization of self as a whole”18 depends on finding 
an ethical commitment to which one can devote one’s life. Next, the dependency 
argument asserts that individuals need communities to achieve full-fledged selfhood.  
Kegley claims that “An individual is both self-made and a social product and the 
worthiness of the end result, the individual self, is the responsibility of both the individual 
and the community…”19 Because the self is an ethical task, it can only be realized “in a 
moral order that embraces other selves equally engaged in the process of self-
realization,” and thus individuals depend on a community that can facilitate such a task.20 
Communities, in turn, are said to depend on individuals, because a community’s identity 
is a consequence of precisely the individuals it claims as members and because it is only 
individuals who can carry out the will of the community.21 Since individuals and 
communities are mutually dependent, their will is understood to be continuous, and the 
reality of community to lie therein. 
But the dependency argument already puts too much space between individuals 
and communities.  It suggests that there are semi-constituted, or semi-independent 
individuals who come to a community already with a kind of proto-self. As Smith has it, 
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“The members of the genuine community are losing their lives in order to find them.” 
Likewise for Kegley, individual members of the community must “concur in accepting 
each self as a fellow member.”22  Framing the issue in these terms gives the impression 
that individuals can choose to opt out of community, deciding to go their own way and 
pursue their own projects, albeit less effectively than if they were members of a 
community. This way of reconstructing Royce’s point also makes it sound like 
individuals bound together in service of a cause may share a common end and yet remain 
individuals. This would make Roycean communities amount to the same as Deweyean 
publics: an aggregate responding to a common problem (or working for some common 
goal).  But none of this interdependence entails that the community is real, or a collective 
agent, and framing the issue in these terms doesn’t help us make sense of Royce’s 
insistence that the universe is of the nature of a community.  It will be argued below that 
if the community is real, if the universe reflects the social structure of a community, there 
are no individuals outside of communities. That is, individuals do not have lives to give 
except as members of a community, and community membership cannot be understood in 
terms of each member qua discrete, deliberating individual “accepting” other members.  
If we are to do justice to Royce’s theory of communal agency, we need a new way of 
formulating his theory that avoids the shortcomings of the dependency argument. 
 
Josiah Royce as Christian Philosopher 
 Frank Oppenheim’s account of community makes the community a reality and a 
unity in no uncertain terms. Oppenheim correctly emphasizes that the reality of 
community depends on the universe bearing the structure of a “Community of 
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Interpretation.” In the foreword to The Problem of Christianity, Oppenheim states, “For 
[Royce,] reality is a temporal process of networking interpreters…the nature of reality 
[is] inescapably communal.”23  However, Oppenheim makes the unity of this process 
depend on the “Interpreter-Spirit,”24 or the Christian God, who is understood to be the 
source of final reconciliation between what would otherwise be disparate elements of the 
process of interpretation.  Elsewhere, Oppenheim also claims that The Problem of 
Christianity “is intended essentially as a work in the philosophy of the Christian religion” 
and that “chapters 11-13 of the Problem[] Royce developed…simply as a tool to face 
directly and persistently the pressing problem of Christianity.”25 Oppenheim thus offers a 
reconstruction of Royce that shows communities to be real agents, but does so at the cost 
of overemphasizing Royce’s religious concerns.  This runs the risk of making Royce’s 
position appear acceptable only on the condition of belief in a Christian God, a rendering 
of Royce’s philosophy that unnecessarily narrows the audience to which it might appeal. 
Oppenheim’s work should be praised for its focus on Royce’s religious interests, which 
are undeniably present in the entirety of his corpus.  Especially in the increasingly anti-
religious environment that is contemporary academia, this is important work, and as a 
philosopher who sought to find ways of bridging communities, Royce is undoubtedly a 
fruitful resource for thinking across religious/secular divides.  But, as it will be argued 
below, Royce’s views on religion stem from a prior metaphysical picture that is amenable 
to theistic (both Christian and non-Christian) and secular worldviews. Sufficient attention 
to Royce’s “Doctrine of Interpretation” and its origins in Peirce’s thought will show that 
Royce’s view of community is explicable quite apart from Christian religious 
commitments. 
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Communal Agency in Josiah Royce 
There remain significant questions to be answered if we are to flesh out a 
Roycean theory of communal agency.  We have seen that such a theory addresses the 
parallels between individuals and communities through the process of interpretation and 
purposiveness.  Such a theory cannot be defended via arguments by analogy, as we saw 
in Smith above, for even though we might believe that individuals somehow demonstrate 
the communicative process of interpretation and are agential, showing that a collective 
communicates via the same process does not convince us that the collective is also an 
agent.  Most of us are willing to grant that collectives communicate, but precisely what 
remains to be seen is why the unique structure of the process of interpretation brings 
members of a community together in such a way that they constitute a unified agent.  
Furthermore, we must explain Royce’s peculiar sense of purposiveness, both in terms of 
what a “plan of action” is for Royce as well as what it means for an agent to hold one.  
Most importantly, we must explain how a collective agent can hold a plan of action in a 
way that doesn’t reduce to a commitment shared by each of its constituent members (as 
in the non-summative approaches seen above).  
To lay out such a theory, we will first elaborate Royce’s view of purposiveness.  
Chapter II will show the extent to which Royce relies on purposiveness to explain agency 
and will lend credence to his explanatory strategy by taking a close look at typical 
agential activities through the lens of purpose.  Chapter III will offer a clarification of the 
formal “Doctrine of Interpretation” and “Doctrine of Signs” that Royce uses so often in 
his explanation of purposive agency.  This clarification will draw heavily on Peirce’s 
original formulations of these doctrines in order to flesh out aspects of these theories that 
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Royce clearly endorsed but did not devote significant explanatory efforts to.  Having 
fleshed out these formal doctrines in Royce, Chapter IV argues for and explains the claim 
that, for Royce, the process of interpretation simply is the structure of agency.  Chapter V 
then maps this claim onto communities and shows that agency for Royce is the same at 
the level of the individual as it is at the level of the community: a purposive, triadically-
structured process of interpretation. 
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CHAPTER II 
AGENCY AS PURPOSIVENESS 
 
Ideas as Purposive 
Our first step will be to bring into view Royce’s thoughts on agency as a kind of 
purposiveness.  We will do this by examining three distinguishable but deeply connected 
themes in Royce’s thought, namely, ideas, truth, and the self. These themes should shed 
light on what it means to speak of agency as purposiveness in the following ways.  If the 
work and life of ideas—those entities that help us investigate, comprehend, and navigate 
ourselves and our world—can be explained fundamentally in terms of purpose, we can 
show that, to the extent that we are ideating creatures,1 our agency should be understood 
in terms of purposes.  By extension, if part of the work of ideas is accurately grasping 
reality, this too must be understood in terms of purpose.  Royce will have an uncommon 
story to tell about this, one that eschews instrumentalist pictures of idea/world relations, 
but the upshot will be that, without purpose, there is no such thing as truth or falsehood.  
Purposiveness, then, is a necessary condition for normativity, something reserved 
exclusively for agents.  Lastly, selfhood gains importance for our concerns here since a 
self is, quite simply, something of which an agent is possessed; agents are selfly beings. 
But Royce doesn’t conceive of the self as fixed, as a “mere datum” of experience.2  He 
offers the alternative model of a series of developing purposes.  I will argue that to the 
extent that something can be characterized as a self, it can be understood as purposive, 
and to possess its agency therein. 
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 We will begin with one of the first examples that Royce offers us of the link 
between an idea and the world.  Royce invites us to consider the following example.  Let 
us say that we look out a window upon a bay containing “nine ships or ten.”3 We know 
the number of ships to be determinate, to be that number of ships regardless of how we 
count them, and so it seems that “no devotion to the elaboration of the internal meaning 
of your own ideas can get you in presence of the truth about Being. …[T]he collection of 
ships is what it is, before you count.”4 Prima facie our ideas and the world appear to be 
wholly indifferent to each other.  But, as Royce points out,  
the counting of the ships is valid or invalid not alone because of the supposed 
independent being of the ships, but also because of the conscious act whereby just 
this collection of ships was first consciously selected for counting. …[N]o idea is 
true or is false except with reference to the object that this very idea first means to 
select as its own object. Apart from what the idea itself thus somehow assigns as 
its own task, even that independent being yonder, if you assume such being, 
cannot determine the success or failure of the idea.5 
 
Thus, Being is much harder to extricate from our ideas than it seemed at first glance.  On 
Royce’s view of the matter, we miss something fundamental about ideas and the external 
world if we assign a wholly stable and mutually independent existence to both.  
The position that argues for such an independent relation between mind and world 
is precisely the target of Royce’s critique of realism.  In the third lecture of The World 
and the Individual, “Independent Beings: A Critical Examination of Realism,” Royce 
argues that realism is underwritten by the commitment that what is known about an 
object is fundamentally disconnected from and indifferent to what that object really is, 
that “to be real means to be independent of ideas which, while other than a given real 
being, still relate to that being.”6 According to Royce, however, this position is ultimately 
incoherent. Since it is committed to “two absolutely independent real Beings,”7 namely, 
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mind and world, these two Beings are “forever sundered,” without any real relations to tie 
them together.  Hence, the realist effectively disallows that ideas could ever successfully 
link up with the world, for the simple reason that knowledge of the world on the part of 
ideas would be a kind of relation between the two.8 
If we ever hope to put our ideas in contact with the world, our account of the 
relation between the two must recognize that, “unless ideas first voluntarily bind 
themselves to a given task, and so, by their internal purpose…commit themselves to a 
certain selection of [their] object, they are neither true nor false…”9  It is this “internal 
purpose” of ideas that we wish to highlight here.10 For Royce, the “internal meaning” of 
an idea is “the relatively completed embodiment and…the partial fulfillment of a 
purpose.”11  Given the unconventionality of explaining ideas in terms of purpose, this 
position will require some unpacking.  We must first take note that Royce is not drawing 
a distinction between the purpose embodied in an idea and the purpose of the person or 
will that deploys that idea as a means to an end. For Royce, ideas themselves are the 
articulation and incomplete fulfillment of a purpose. As such, ideas set for themselves a 
goal; they are “selective. [The idea] seeks its own. It attends as itself has chosen. It 
desires in its own way.”12  Indeed, this structure describes not only ideas, but also the 
will.13 “My idea,” Royce tells us, “is a cognitive process only in so far as it is, at the same 
time, a voluntary process, an act…”14 My will, then, is coextensive with my ideas, and 
the internal meaning of my ideas consists in the fact that “In so far as I purpose, intend, 
pursue, or find myself accomplishing, it is of the very essence of my will to demand its 
own Other, to set its fulfillment beyond its present…”15 To put this seeking, this 
‘demanding of an Other,’ in different words, ideas always select an object or an aim 
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towards which they are directed.  In the empirical sciences, for example, it is our ideas 
qua hypotheses that  
determine what differences amongst facts shall come to [our] observation. Careful 
measurement, for instance, that most characteristic of the processes upon which 
exact empirical science is based, involves a typically objective…attitude of 
attention. Yet…we must insist that just this attitude, observant as it is of certain 
small differences which our less exact activities ignore, finds what it seeks…viz. 
precisely these small differences themselves, which meet our intent…16 
 
An idea, then, is not a passive representation of its object, but a directedness towards it. 
Of course, this understanding of ideas fundamentally alters what it means for an idea to 
correspond to its object. While we are not here concerned to fully explain Royce’s theory 
of truth, seeing the ways in which our definitions of correspondence must be altered will 
help bring home the purposiveness of ideas, as well as lead us to a wider view of its 
importance for agency in general.   
 
Correspondence, Truth, and the Status of Ideas 
The definition of truth as “Correspondence between any Idea and its Object,” 
Royce claims, has “[u]ntil recently…remained extremely undeveloped,” despite its 
“obvious[] fundamental importance.”17  This is a consequence of the fact that “two 
complicated objects, or two collections of objects, may be made to correspond to one 
another, part for part…in wholly different ways.”18  A map, a ledger, and a picture all 
attempt correspondence with their objects, but while a map and a picture bear some 
physical resemblance to what they stand for (i.e., a picture of a mountain looks just like 
that mountain; the contours on a map mimic the contours of the geography the map 
captures), a ledger is just a series of numbers, and in this sense does not resemble the 
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accounts or transactions of which it is a record.19   The common feature, however, the one 
necessary for all correspondence relations, is that one is  
able to view the corresponding objects together, in a one-to-one relation, or in 
some definite way, and, with some single purpose in mind…[and] be able in some 
one perhaps very limited aspect to affirm of one of them the same that you, at the 
same time and in the same limited sense, affirm of the other. In consequence, with 
reference to this one affirmation, you could in some specified wise substitute one 
of them for the other, whole for whole, part for part, element for element.20 
 
We may say that if the purpose of my map of Oregon is to show whether Eugene is south 
of Portland, the map corresponds to its object precisely insofar as I can, by affirming 
Eugene’s relative location to Portland on the map, thereby affirm the same of actual 
Oregon geography and accomplish my goal. Or, what is more likely, if the purpose of my 
map of Oregon is to help me navigate between Eugene and Portland, then the map 
achieves correspondence to the extent that it helps me successfully set out from Eugene 
and arrive in Portland, thus fulfilling its purpose. In the case of a ledger, given the 
purpose of canceling debts, the numbers correspond to the accounts they record just in 
case I can, by performing calculations in the ledger, affirm some definite relation of debt 
between the real accounts and figure out what money is owed to whom.  In both cases, 
the correspondence relation must be understood in terms of the purport, or the “internal 
meaning” of the representing object.21  Indeed, “no degree of unlikeness in appearance 
between the two objects” precludes correspondence, so long as both objects possess 
“some system of ideally definable characters” common to both, which enable us to fulfill 
“the systematic purpose for which the particular correspondence is established.”22 Ideas 
are no exception to these strictures. An idea corresponds to its object, i.e., is true, “if it 
possess the sort of correspondence with the object that the idea itself wants to possess.”23  
This is why Royce insists that the only proper evaluation of an idea is in terms of its 
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purpose.  Asking which ideas are true, Royce claims, is like asking which tools are good, 
in that the question is unanswerable absent some purpose that can frame the decision.24 
As Royce formulates this point in his 1915 “Metaphysics” lectures, just as “[i]n the case 
of the marksmen, if there was no aiming, there was no hitting or missing.”25  And so even 
truth, a quintessentially normative term, is, on Royce’s account, only possible given the 
purposiveness of ideas.26 
 At this point we must pause to clarify something about the status of ideas. 
Especially in light of Royce's infamy as the preeminent Absolute idealist of the turn of 
the century, and given idealism's reputation as a philosophical tradition that conflates the 
world with our ideas about it, we should take this opportunity to trace Royce’s distinction 
between reality and our ideas about it. Furthermore, despite Royce’s use of terms like 
“internal purpose” and “internal meaning,” it will be instructive to see that he does not 
take ideas to be mental entities.  Doing so will help avoid any misunderstanding of 
purposive agency as something taking place within the minds of agents. 
While it’s true that Royce rejects the empiricist thesis that objects determine their 
ideas,27 this does not mean that ideas are sufficient to fully determine their objects.  In 
fact, Royce says explicitly that it is only the some “Other,” an “external meaning,” than 
can answer the question asked by an idea: “the object of a true finite idea…is in any case 
something other than the mere idea itself. And the truth of the idea depends upon a 
confirmation of this idea through the presence and the characters of this other, —the 
object.”28 The truth of ideas is premised on the specific purpose they embody, their 
aiming at an object, but they are not true by virtue of this aiming alone.  The idea selects 
what it looks for (its external meaning), but only the world, or something that is not the 
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idea, can fulfill or thwart that idea’s purpose.  Indeed, given this heavy dependence on the 
external for the truth of our ideas, we would do well to make note of another 
characterization of ideas that Royce offers us. At the International Congress of 
Philosophy, held in Heidelberg in 1908, Royce proclaimed, “Thought is a mode of 
action…an idea present in the consciousness of a thinker is simply a present 
consciousness of some expression of a purpose, —a plan of action.”29  As plans of action, 
ideas are deeds carried out in the world rather than representational entities in the mind. 
Considering the example of ships on the bay, we now see that the idea of the quantity of 
ships, incomplete when first formed, cannot be completed by a mental process.  The idea, 
the inquiry that it guides, is fulfilled only by interaction with the idea’s “Other”—the 
actual number of ships on the bay—making the fulfillment of the idea a public and 
worldly event, something observable that can be corroborated or refuted by others.30   
 Ideas, for Royce, are capable of doing their work only because of their 
fundamentally purposive character.  Were they the inert reflections of reality that the 
realist holds them to be, they would have no hope of ever coming in contact with the 
world. Without some specific purpose of which ideas are the partial completion, without 
an end of inquiry sought after, there would be no criterion for evaluating their truth or 
falsehood. “The embodied purpose, the internal meaning, of the instant’s act, is thus a 
conditio sine qua non for all external meaning and for all truth.”31 We must not forget, 
however, that for Royce, this relation of seeking and fulfillment characterizes not only 
ideas, but also the will.  “Every idea is as much a volitional process as it is an intellectual 
process.”32  On the Roycean account, agents are a kind of being-towards-the-world.  If 
something can be characterized as an agent, if it has ideas (in Royce’s capacious sense of 
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the term), if it wills, if it is subject to any kind of normative assessment, then that same 
thing is fundamentally purposive. Agents, for Royce, are creatures that live and move and 
have their being in the space of purposes. 
 
The Purposive Self 
Turning to the question of selfhood, we find that Royce parts ways with any 
picture of the self as a static and self-identical ego. As Kegley frames Royce’s conception 
of the self, “The self is not a substance, not a ‘thing.’ The self is a process. What one 
discovers in human consciousness is movement.”33  This movement, for Royce, is first 
and foremost a movement through time.  Royce thinks that consideration of the temporal 
situation of the self banishes centralized models of the ego, and in their place offers a 
model which is always threefold in nature.  “When a process of conscious reflection goes 
on, a man may be said to interpret himself to himself.  In this case, although but one 
personality, in the usual sense of the term, is in question, the relation is still really a 
triadic relation.”34  This triadic relation35 is comprised of a “conversation” between the 
past self, the present self, and the future self.  Insisting on communication with one’s past 
self may seem like a strange claim, especially coming from an author who insists on the 
completed and even “irrevocable” nature of the past,36 but fleshing out the triadic relation 
in its concrete details shows Royce’s point to be quite plausible.   
The “man of the past” leaves behind things like “promises, notes, records, old 
letters…[,]” such that even though the past self is no longer present, it remains in the 
form of a “resolve;” goals or aspirations that have yet to be accomplished.37  When the 
present self comes upon signs of the past self, whether they are memories or physical 
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artifacts like a journal, he interprets their meaning: “‘This,’ he says, ‘is what I meant 
when I made that promise.’ ‘This is what I wrote or recorded or promised.’”38  
Furthermore, this interpretation of the past self on the part of the present self is situated 
within the same temporal structure: “‘Therefore,’ he continues, addressing his future self, 
‘I am now committed to doing thus, planning thus,’ and so on.”39  At any moment in 
time, the self is comprised of a process in which a present self interprets a past self to a 
future self.  Take the example of a career choice. At some point in time, a goal forms for 
a present self such that this self sets before it the end of, for example, becoming a medical 
professional.  As time progresses, this present self becomes a past self, leaving behind 
aspirations and consequences of those aspirations (e.g., an application to medical school).  
The goal and consequences formed by the now past self become something to be taken 
up and reformulated by the present self.  The present self looks back upon the plans of the 
previous self and decides upon the proper meaning of the past self’s aspirations (e.g., it 
reaffirms the decision to apply to medical school), and takes them up in light of new 
purposes, such as new strategies for how to go about achieving such an occupation (e.g., 
it decides to also pursue internship opportunities).  And this formulation does not hang in 
the air, as it were, but is always directed towards a future self, one that will assume the 
same responsibilities and undertake the same tasks of reflection and reformulation once it 
becomes a present self.  
Now, what does this discussion of the conversation between past, present, and 
future selves have to do with purposiveness? Quite simply, a self is nothing more than a 
plan of action, which plan is set forth and taken up continuously in time by a series of 
successive selves.40 “[A] self is a self by virtue of the fact that he is doing something that 
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constitutes a plan having unity or coherence…”41 What the present self interprets when it 
looks to the signs of the past self is just what the past self’s plans or purposes were (what 
we have called “internal meaning” above). When the present self reformulates those 
plans and addresses signs to the future self, it does so as the partial expression of a 
purpose, one that, because partial, must be carried forward by a future self if it is to 
progress towards completion at all.  As was the case with ideas, the self’s plans of action 
reach their fulfillment when they bring about the desired state of affairs. In the case of the 
aspiring medical professional, this might take the form of achieving good grades in 
requisite pre-med classes.  However, as we have seen, Royce insists that fulfillment is 
always partial, and that this is concomitant with finitude. While the would-be 
professional celebrates her very real achievement, she must also realize that this 
achievement only brings her partially closer to her long-term career.  Similarly, once she 
reaches her desired occupation, this will not be an ultimate end.  Instead, there will 
remain future goals (e.g., helping people) towards which she still aims and that are only 
partially fulfilled by attaining her ideal job. 
Royce’s psychological work reflects this understanding of the self as a purposive 
process.  “Every act of reasoning,” Royce tells us,  
involves new reactions of our own in the presence of a situation…The essence of 
reasoning, as of the whole thinking process, is that I am not merely concerned 
with the way in which images float before me, but with my consciousness of what 
I am doing with these images, or with the objects that the images suggest.42 
 
Even the reasoning self is, in psychological terms, to be understood with an eye to its 
purposes. More than just a process of arranging or analyzing appearances, reasoning 
involves the way in which the self does something with them, some way that it 
contextualizes these images in light of some end being achieved. Significantly, even self-
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consciousness is rooted in the purposive nature of the self.  Royce argues that the origin 
of our cognitive abilities is fundamentally social, that interpersonal relations are 
absolutely critical for the formation of “higher forms of consciousness,” such as 
language, conception, the formation of abstract ideas, and reasoning.43  The self “comes 
to consciousness only in contrast with other selves. There is no reason why one should be 
aware of his whole plan of life, or of his personal character…unless he has had occasion 
to compare his behaviour, his feelings, and his ideals, with those of other men.”44  Most 
importantly for our interests, this comparison is chiefly a comparison of purposes: “[T]he 
Self comes to consciousness in normal cases only in connection with organised plans of 
conduct… Our social self-consciousness leads us to form such plans, and to compare 
them with those of other people.”45  In other words, the very condition of self-
consciousness is that we come to formulate and contrast our own purposes with those of 
others.46 
The self as purposive is a signal idea for Royce’s ethical work as well.  In the 
opening chapter of The Philosophy of Loyalty, Royce states that loyalty, as a commitment 
or goal undertaken by an individual, is a vital condition for a coherent self, and even a 
sense of self-worth. “Loyalty, again, tends to unify life, to give it centre, fixity, 
stability.”47 According to Royce, it is only by committing ourselves to an ethical “cause” 
that we can ever reach fulfillment in the ethical sphere.  When we are loyal to a cause, we 
make decisions in light of it; it serves to guide us. And of those who consciously devote 
themselves to a cause, Royce tells us,  
Such people may or may not have been right in their choice of a cause. But at 
least they have exemplified through their loyalty one feature of a rational moral 
life. They have known what it was to have unity of purpose…[T]hey have found 
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themselves worthless except when viewed as active, as confidently devoted, as 
willing instruments of their cause.48  
 
Royce’s ethical treatise devotes considerable efforts to describing the nature of causes, 
loyalty to them, and the adjudication between them, and thus the details of the account 
significantly exceed the space available here.  Let us note, however, that the very 
possibility of a unified self depends on a purpose which that self can embody.49 A life 
lived without a purpose qualifies as an “organism,” and perhaps even a “psychological 
specimen,” but on Royce’s view, “he would be no personality.”50  A life lived with many 
purposes, but ones which stand in no organized relation to each other, offers us “glimpses 
of selfhood,” but not yet “one self, no one person discoverable.”51 One becomes a self in 
the fullest sense of the word “just in so far as the life that goes on in connection with your 
organism has some one purpose running through it…in so far as it expresses some one 
purpose.”52 
It would not be an exaggeration to say that the purposive nature of the self is even 
Royce’s proposed solution to the problem of other minds. Royce famously criticized 
arguments from analogy for the existence of other minds53 (though it was his good friend 
and philosophical rival who most often bore the brunt of these critiques).  “James himself 
follows a well-known and ancient philosophical tradition by declaring that our assertion 
of the existence of our neighbor’s mind depends upon the argument from analogy.”54  
Such arguments claim that we come to knowledge of other minds by first seeing which of 
our behaviors correspond with which of our mental states, and then reasoning from the 
perception of the same behavior in others to the existence of similar mental states.55  
Based on Royce’s view of agency and purpose, however, Royce cannot accept this. A 
mind denotes the purposive process of interpretation as we saw above (a present self 
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interpreting a past self to a future self) and is not well described as merely a collection of 
ideas.  Accordingly, we miss something crucial about other minds if we simply reason 
from percepts to what ideas must lie behind them. “[W]hen I deal with another mind, I do 
not merely expect to get definable perceptions from that mind; I expect that mind to give 
me new ideas, new meanings, new plans, which…are known…to be not my own...”56  
Royce urges that what we encounter with other people is not another mind, ideating 
behind a veil of percepts, but a plan of action that is understood to be coherent and 
recognizable as other than our own: “The contrasts, surprises, conflicts, and puzzles 
which these new ideas present to me show me that in dealing with them I am dealing with 
what in some respects is not my own mind. The coherence of the whole system of 
interpretations, ideas, plans, and purposes shows me just as positively that I am dealing 
with a mind…”57 
 It is difficult to overstate the importance of purpose for Royce. In place of 
accounts that rely on substantial notions of the self, whether it be in response to the 
question of other minds, the coherence of an ethical self, or even the psychological 
development of self-awareness, the self for Royce will always be defined in terms of 
purpose. Agents, those quintessentially selfly beings, are ultimately to be understood in 
terms of their life plan, the plans of action they formulate, the purposes they embody.  To 
adapt Hume’s phrase, it would be fair to say that on Royce’s view, a self is a bundle of 
purposes.  
Indeed, Hume is an appropriate author to invoke here, for a brief comparison with 
Hume takes directly into the next stage of our reconstruction of agency in Royce. The 
immediate concern raised by Hume’s critique of the substantial ego must also be asked of 
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Royce. Once Hume dispenses of any underlying substrate in which perceptions inhere, 
we are compelled to ask where the notion of a self comes from, and why we are ever 
tempted to assign identity or individuality to the various bundles of perceptions that we 
are.  Similarly, the question for Royce is, what is it that ties our various purposes 
together? Despite the great variety of purposes which we may adopt in a lifetime, we do 
in fact maintain that there is some enduring identity throughout such changes of purpose, 
so that even at the age of 42, while my goals will most assuredly be different than they 
are at present, I will be the same person.  The question is, in other words, in what sense is 
there a unity to the series of purposes embodied in a present self interpreting a past self to 
a future self? What holds this series of temporally displaced interpreters together as a 
single agent? To answer these questions, and to render more precise the preliminary 
definition of agency offered above, we must turn to Royce’s “Doctrine of Interpretation” 
and “Doctrine of Signs” and explain them in their fullest sense and technical nuance.
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CHAPTER III 
INTERPRETATION AND SIGNS 
 
The Doctrine of Interpretation 
 As was brought to light at the end of Chapter II, Royce’s view of agency as 
purposiveness raises questions about the unity of agency that require an investigation of 
the more formal side of his thought, specifically his use of the technical terms 
“interpretation” and “sign.” As we shall eventually see, these concepts are the formal 
underpinnings of his thought about all unified agency. As such, this chapter is a 
necessary inquiry into and explication of the salient formal characteristics of the process 
of interpretation and signs.  We will explain this process as triadic, asymmetrical, 
comprised of signs, and entailing an infinite series of interpretations.  This will require a 
return to Peirce’s original study of these notions, which should assuage worries about the 
use Royce makes of Peirce’s thought and also put us in position to grasp the unity of 
purposive agency in Royce. 
 Our first step will be to bring forth the basic features that define the process of 
interpretation. The picture of selfhood seen above, in which a present self interprets a past 
self to a future self, instantiates the process of interpretation in its precise technical sense, 
for “In the technical phrase, interpretation is a triadic relation. That is, you cannot express 
any complete process of interpreting by merely naming two terms,—persons, or other 
objects,—and by then telling what dyadic relation exists between one of these two and 
the other.”1 This is the first characteristic of interpretation: it is a process that is 
irreducibly triadic.   
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Next, “The triadic relation in question is, in its essence, non-symmetrical,—that 
is, unevenly arranged with respect to all three terms.”2 By this Royce means that in any 
given process of interpretation, interpretation “travels” in one direction, such that  
somebody (let us say A)—the translator or interpreter—interprets somebody (let 
us say B) to somebody (let us say C). If you transpose the order of the terms—A, 
B, C,—an account of the happening which constitutes an interpretation must be 
altered, or otherwise may become either false or meaningless.3 
 
In other words, it is not only which members take part in a given process of interpretation 
that make it that process, it is also the “determinate order” in which members stand to one 
another. “One of the three terms is the interpreter; a second term is the object—the 
person…which is interpreted; the third is the person to whom the interpretation is 
addressed.”4  Thus, ‘A interprets B to C’ describes a logically distinct process of 
interpretation from ‘B interprets A to C,’ precisely because the roles of the various 
members within the process of interpretation differ. The second characteristic of 
interpretation, then, is that it is a “non-symmetrical” relation involving members which 
stand in some specific order to each other. 
 For the sake of clarity, we have so far been discussing single, discrete processes 
of interpretation.  Interpretation, however, is never truly to be found as an isolated 
process completed by three members.   
[T]he interpreted object is itself something which has the nature of a mental 
expression. Peirce uses the term “sign” to name this mental object which is 
interpreted. …[S]ince the interpretation is [also] a mental act, and is an act which 
is expressed, the interpretation itself is, in its turn, a Sign. This new sign calls for 
further interpretation. For the interpretation is addressed to somebody. And so,—
at least in ideal,—the social process involved is endless.5  
 
The definition of “sign,” a technical term for both Peirce and Royce, will become crucial, 
and to fully appreciate it we will need to explore Peirce’s original formulation of it.  For 
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now, however, we must understand how Royce grasps the term and its implications.  Let 
us note that this usage of “the nature of a mental expression” should not be understood as 
an ascription of properties of “mind-stuff,” or as invoking other dualisms.  As per our 
discussion above, we should recall that ideas are “the express[ion], although in general 
the incomplete fulfillment of a purpose.”6 To say that objects of interpretation are of “the 
nature of mental expression” is to say that they possess the same characteristics as ideas, 
i.e., that they are purposive, or that they partially embody a purpose. Furthermore, in 
contrast to processes of perception, which have their “terminus in some object 
perceived,”7 and in contrast to processes of conception, which are “contented…with 
defining the universal type, or ideal form which chances to become an object of 
somebody’s thought,”8 
 interpretation both requires as its basis the sign or mental expression which is to 
be interpreted, and calls for a further interpretation of its own act, just because it 
addresses itself to some third being. Thus interpretation is not only an essentially 
social process, but also a process which, when once initiated, can be terminated 
only by an external and arbitrary interruption, such as death or social separation. 
By itself, the process of interpretation calls, in ideal, for an infinite sequence of 
interpretations. For every interpretation, being addressed to somebody, demands 
interpretation from the one to whom it is addressed.9 
 
The third characteristic of the process of interpretation pertains to its members. 
Something can take part in the process of interpretation if and only if it is a sign.  And 
this criterion for participation in the process of interpretation leads us to the fourth and 
final characteristic: since a sign is something that is both the product of a process of 
interpretation and something that—short of interruptions of the communicative potential 
of signs—calls for further interpretation, this means that the triadic process of 
interpretation is always actually an infinite series of interpretation(s).  Consider Royce’s 
example of an Egyptologist (‘A’) translating an ancient text (‘B’) for an English-speaking 
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readership (‘C’).10  If we render this interpretation as “A interprets B to C,” our picture is 
incomplete, for A’s interpretation is itself something that calls for further interpretation 
(that is, part of the nature of the Egyptologist’s work qua sign is that it can be interpreted 
by future scholars (‘D’) to a future audience (‘E’)).  A more accurate rendering of the 
process would be, “A interprets B to C, D then interprets A’s interpretation (of B to C) to 
E,” and so on ad infinitum.   
We should note the change in meaning of the sign “A” above. In the first instance, 
it is the interpreter herself.  In the second instance, however, the sign calling for future 
interpretation is A’s work, her translation.  Royce frequently vacillates between talk of 
signs in their strictly semiotic capacity and talk of signs as individual agents,11 and this 
slippage presents a potential problem. In the first place, we might treat Royce’s 
appropriation of Peirce with suspicion when we notice that, in contrast to Royce, 
interpretation for Peirce is not first and foremost a process carried out by three individual 
human agents.12 Second, while we might follow Peirce’s account of signs under the guise 
of a theory of semeiotic and be persuaded that the structure of semiosis is triadic, it’s not 
at all obvious that the relations obtaining between signs (in Peirce’s sense) should also 
obtain between human individuals, nor is it obvious what it would even mean for the 
latter to be the case. More specifically, while Peirce’s semeiotic changes the structure of 
representation (or significance, or thought)13 from dyadic to triadic grounds, Peirce 
maintains that, despite mediation, interpretation carries forward the meaning of what is 
interpreted in such a way that the process is a unity (arguing for the reality of the line, as 
it were, which is made up by points, rather than arguing exclusively for the reality of the 
points and not the line).  Transposing this account onto the domain of agents, however, 
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we must negotiate the common counterintuition that when agents interpret one another, 
they do not become unified in anything more than perhaps a metaphorical sense. In other 
words, we tend to think that even in communication, agents remain discrete and 
individual, and not that they form a unified whole.  Royce’s circumspect shifts in 
vocabulary must be addressed if we are to endorse Royce’s appropriation of Peirce’s 
thought and if we are to trace out its implications for Royce’s understanding of agency.14 
 
Peirce, Signs, and the Unity of the Series 
Assessing Royce’s Doctrine of Interpretation and Doctrine of Signs requires a 
look at Peirce’s original thought on these matters, but a brief preliminary is in order.  
Peirce’s thought on signs and interpretation is exceedingly complex.  Peirce’s 
formulations of it evolved throughout his career, his applications of it are varied, its 
details are nuanced, and there are competing interpretations of what Peirce meant to 
accomplish by it, as well as its greater place within Peirce’s work.  However, our interests 
at this point are confined to gaining a broad enough picture of Peirce’s thought on signs 
and interpretation that we can show Royce’s adaptation of these ideas (specifically, his 
person/sign conflation) to accord with their original formulation. Additionally, if it can be 
shown that Royce’s use of these ideas is not at odds with their Peircean articulation, we 
can use Peirce’s treatment of these concepts to fill in gaps left in Royce’s own analysis, 
especially regarding the unity of the series of interpretation. 
Having defined our scope, we can proceed to Peirce.  On Peirce’s definition, a 
sign is: “(1) Anything which determines something else (its interpretant) to refer to an 
object to which itself refers (its object) in the same way, the interpretant becoming in turn 
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a sign, and so on ad infinitum” (2.303).15  While Peirce’s definition of signs incurred 
significant changes throughout his life, we will rely primarily on the definition that 
appeared in Baldwin’s Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, not only because 
Royce’s cites it directly in The Problem of Christianity,16 but also because it captures 
several important and relatively stable characteristics of signs and interpretation that 
endured Peirce’s various reworkings.17  On this definition, a sign must stand in relation to 
an object, however, this dyadic relation is insufficient for significance.18  Significance 
rather depends upon how the sign is taken up (interpreted) by a third thing, namely, the 
interpretant.  Furthermore, the sign determines the interpretant in such a way that it 
relates the interpretant back to the object to which the sign already stands in some 
relation. This latter relation between object and interpretant is critical, for it precludes the 
construal of significance as consisting in a dyadic relation, such as the taking up of the 
sign by the interpretant. As Peirce puts it in his unpublished “Syllabus,” “The triadic 
relation is genuine, that is its three members are bound together by it in a way that does 
not consist in any complexus of dyadic relations” (2.274).  Thus, significance necessarily 
involves the sign bringing the interpretant into relation with the sign’s object as well, for 
only with this relation is the criterion of triadicity satisfied. This explains why the process 
of interpretation leads to an infinite series: if significance is a triadic relation and the 
meaning of the sign is, in part, the result of its being taken up by an interpretant,19 then an 
interpretant itself cannot have meaning apart from its being taken up by some new 
interpretant, at which point the old interpretant becomes a sign, and so on ad infinitum. 
 With these basic pieces of Peirce’s formulation in place, we are now poised to 
explain the unity of the process of interpretation. We will draw heavily on John Sheriff’s 
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lucid analysis and diagrams to clarify this crucial point. As we have just seen, since 
significance is a triadic relation, when an interpretant takes up a sign, it also is brought 
into relation with the sign’s object (call this ‘Triad 1’; Fig. 1).  Sheriff diagrams this triad 
in the following manner:20 
 
    Figure 1. Triad 1 
 
Similarly, when the interpretant becomes a sign for a new interpretant, the new 
interpretant takes up the sign and is brought into relation with the sign’s object (call this 
‘Triad 2’; Fig. 2), which object is now the sign and object of Triad 1 taken together.  
 
Figure 2. Triad 2 
 
And again, when Triad 2’s interpretant becomes a sign for yet a new interpretant, this 
newest interpretant takes up Triad 2’s interpretant as a sign and is brought into relation 
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with its object (call this ‘Triad 3’; Fig. 3), which object is now Triad 1’s interpretant, 
sign, and object taken together. 
     
 
         Figure 3. Triad 3 
 
 
This, then, explains how unity extends beyond a single triad of interpretation. The infinite 
series is always triadic and is so in such a way that it preserves the members of the series 
that have preceded any given interpretation. 
It also behooves us at this point to clarify what will be termed the “trivalence 
claim.” Peirce would acknowledge that the bracketing off of a single triad of 
interpretation from the infinite series for explanatory purposes is potentially misleading, 
for it suggests that each member of a triad plays only one role (object, sign, or 
interpretant). In fact, the infinite series entails that every member of the process of 
interpretation plays all three roles.  This point is easy to see with the help of Sheriff’s 
diagrams when moving forwards in the series. Take the interpretant of Triad 1. In Triad 
2, it becomes a sign, and in Triad 3 it becomes an object, thus playing all three roles of 
interpretation over time.  Similarly, the sign of Triad 1 becomes the object in Triad 2. 
Since the series is infinite, trivalence holds for all signs of the series going forward. 
Trivalence going backwards requires slightly more explanation, but leads to the same 
conclusion.  Consider what Peirce has to say about the ‘beginning’ of the infinite series: 
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 At any moment we are in possession of certain information, that is, of cognitions 
which have been logically derived by induction and hypothesis from previous 
cognitions which are less general, less distinct, and of which we have a less lively 
consciousness. These in their turn have been derived from others still less general, 
less distinct, and less vivid; and so on back to the ideal first, which is quite 
singular, and quite out of consciousness. The ideal first is the particular thing-in-
itself. It does not exist as such. (5.311) 
 
The nature of cognitions (here being synonymous with “signs”) is that they are the result 
of previous cognitions.  Thus, if a cognition is a member of the series, it has been 
determined by previous cognitions, and so the infinite nature of the series precludes the 
possibility of any ‘first’ cognition not determined by a previous one. Thus, moving 
backwards in the series, the trivalence claim cashes out in the following terms.  The 
object of Triad 1 is not the ‘beginning’ of the series, but rather always already a sign for a 
previous object (in a Triad that would preceded Triad 1 pictured above). Since this 
previous (unpictured) object itself must be a sign determined by a previous object, this 
means that the object of Triad 1 is also already an interpretant, taking up the relation 
between preceding (unpictured) sign and object.  The upshot of the trivalence claim is 
that members do not ‘begin’ or ‘end’ their interpretation, but rather have their very 
existence in the various interpretative relations in which they always stand to other signs.  
The designations “sign,” “object,” and “interpretant” are ways of pointing out various 
roles in the process of interpretation that every member of the process plays at some point 
in time. 
 
Royce’s Use of Interpretation and Signs   
So much for Peirce’s formulations of signs, interpretation, and the unity of the 
series.  We now shift our focus back to Royce’s work to make sure we don’t find 
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anything objectionable in his co-opting of these doctrines. Let us consider what Royce 
takes to be a commonplace “Community of Interpretation:”  
Suppose that somebody,—let us call him A,—desires to do business with another 
man, whom we will call C.  So far, some relation involving the pair consisting of 
A and C is sought. But perhaps A and C are dwellers in different cities, or in 
different countries. Perhaps they are not on speaking terms.  Perhaps they speak 
different languages. …In such cases the dual relation whereby A might do 
business with C, cannot readily be established. What shall A do? …A finds some 
third man,—let us call him B,—who undertakes to represent A’s plans to C, to 
interpret, to explain, to urge them in C’s presence; to act, in a word, as the agent 
of A in the proposed dealing with C.21  
 
Mapping these relations in Peirce’s vocabulary, A is the object, B is the sign, and C is the 
interpretant. Notice that Royce does not make the sign/interpretant distinction.22 This 
makes matters difficult, as he calls B the interpretant, again differing from Peirce in 
details of terminology. Yet despite superficial discrepancies, Royce portrays the activities 
of each member of this Community of Interpretation in terms perfectly consistent with 
Peirce’s articulation seen above. Notice that the sign in Royce’s example cannot be C, 
for, within the example, C is not described as determining anything further. The sign also 
cannot be A, because A is not said to stand in relation to something to which it will relate 
the next sign in the series.23 Thus, B must be the sign. It stands in a certain relation to A 
insofar as B knows A to be, let us say, a vendor, and in so far as B is capable of 
representing A’s interests.  B, as the appointed representative of A, determines C, let us 
say, the client, in such a way as to get C to recognize (i.e., to stand in relation to) A in just 
the way that B already does (i.e., to see A as a vendor).  (Moreover, as we will see below 
through the trivalence claim, even though Royce calls B the interpretant, C can be said to 
interpret A through B, since it is B’s representation of A that acquaints C with A and 
allows C to speak to the relation between A and B.)24 
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So far this all accords with how Peirce would designate each member of this triad, 
but what about the capacity of the interpretant (in Royce’s example, C) to become a sign 
for further interpretation and the unity of the series that arises therein?  We have already 
seen above that, for Royce, to be of the nature of a “mental expression” means to be a 
sign, which means being something that calls for further interpretation. While Royce 
doesn’t tease out this dimension of signs within the particular Community of 
Interpretation quoted above, he clearly has it in mind when he tells us that  
Since an interpretation of a sign is, in its turn, the expression of the interpreter’s 
mind, it constitutes a new sign, which again calls for interpretation; and so on 
without end; unless the process is arbitrarily interrupted…A sign, then, is an 
object whose being consists in the fact that the sign calls for an interpretation.25   
 
Recognizing this dimension of signs ultimately commits Royce to the unity of the series, 
as well. While Royce does not address this point by speaking of future Communities of 
Interpretation that interpret the community comprised of A, B, and C, his appreciation of 
the unity of the series is made evident in passages such as the following: 
 If, then, the real world contains the Community of Interpretation just 
characterized, this community of interpretation expresses its life in an infinite 
series of individual interpretation, each of which occupies its own place in a 
perfectly real order of time. …[T]his whole time-process is in some fashion 
spanned by one insight26 which surveys the unity of its meaning.27 
 
As we have seen with the help of Sheriff’s diagrams, this is precisely the unity that Peirce 
ascribes to the infinite series; it is not infinite as a never-ending sequence of discrete 
additions, but rather infinite as a series that preserves all signs that participate in it.28 And 
with Peirce, Royce takes this unity to entail the trivalence claim. A sign, Royce tells us, is 
 something that determines an interpretation. A sign may also be called an 
expression of a mind; and, in our ordinary social intercourse, it actually is such an 
expression. Or again, one may say that a sign is, in its essence, either a mind or a 
quasi-mind, an object that fulfils the functions of a mind.29 
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If a sign is something that determines an interpretation, then we know that A in the above 
is example is also a sign.  And if C is what ultimately offers an interpretation of the 
relation between A and B, and if this interpretation itself calls for future interpretation, 
then we know that C is also a sign. For Royce as well as Peirce, then, all members of the 
process of interpretation, because they are signs, play all three roles (i.e., object, sign, and 
interpretant). 
Before moving on, an example illustrating the trivalence claim should lend 
concreteness to its otherwise formalistic definition above.  Let us return to the example of 
the ancient text, the Egyptologist, and an English-speaking audience.  Bracketing off a 
single triad, the ancient text is the object, the Egyptologist the sign, and the audience the 
interpretant.  The ancient text, however, is not the ‘beginning’ of the process of 
interpretation, but already a sign of some previous object. Let us say the text is a record 
of ancient customs, and the first of its kind to be recorded in writing.  The text is then a 
sign of a preceding oral tradition, and, more precisely, the oral tradition as it stood when 
it was written down.  And of course, that oral tradition as it stood when written down is 
itself a sign for (and interpretation of) previous generations who transmitted that oral 
tradition, so the written text is also an interpretant that takes up the relation between its 
contemporary generation of oral history and that of previous generations.  Similarly, the 
Egyptologist is not just a sign, but also object and interpretant: an object once the 
English-speaking audience interprets the relation between the translation and the original 
text (e.g., in the form of criticism) and an interpretant because since the written text is the 
result of a preceding oral tradition, the translation is said to take up both the written work 
and its history.  Finally, the English-speaking audience, since its interpretation is 
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addressed to some future audience, is also a sign, and since this future audience will in 
turn address its interpretation to another audience, the English-speaking audience is an 
object.  And lest there be any confusion, even our illustration of the trivalence claim 
across time is a simplification of the live workings of signs, for a sign at any moment is 
never a member of just one Community of Interpretation.  This means that the trivalence 
of signs is not only something that unfolds across time, but that all signs may be trivalent 
at any given moment.  The Egyptologist is a sign in relation to the text and the English-
speaking audience, but she is simultaneously an object qua something interpreted by her 
parents (imagine her proud parents bragging of her achievements to their friends at the 
very moment she is translating) and simultaneously an interpretant qua friend (imagine 
her contemplating in the back of her mind, mid-translation, what to give her friend as a 
birthday gift after being reminded of the occasion by a mutual friend). 
 Tracking the trivalence claim backwards and forwards in time and across 
Communities of Interpretation can be dizzying, but the takeaway for Royce is the same as 
it was for Peirce: to speak of a single triad of interpretation is to artificially isolate one 
triad out of a single series. Unpacking the trivalence claim, then, and bringing to light that 
each member of the process of interpretation plays all three roles of object, sign, and 
interpretant, even at the same time, should help us avoid losing sight of the complexity of 
the series of interpretation for Royce.  As we will see, the unity of the series and the 
trivalence claim are crucial for Royce’s view of community. For right now, however, we 
need only note that Royce’s use of Peirce’s theory of signs and interpretation is consistent 
with Peirce’s own original formulation.
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CHAPTER IV 
THE FORM OF AGENCY 
 
The Triadic Structure of Agency 
Having laid the groundwork for Royce’s view of agency with our discussions of 
purposiveness, interpretation, and signs, we are now prepared to flesh out Royce’s 
conception of agency in greater depth.  The most significant challenge that arose for our 
account of agency at the end of Chapter II was the question of unity: how can a series of 
interpreting selves be said to comprise a single agent?  We have already seen that, for 
Royce, agency is first and foremost to be understood in terms of purposiveness.  What we 
now endeavor to show is that the very structure of purposiveness for Royce is triadic in 
nature, that is, the structure of purposiveness is the process of interpretation.  Indeed, the 
central thesis to be defended in this chapter is that the categories of agency and 
interpretation are coextensive for Royce.  On this view, there are no processes of 
interpretation that are non-agential and there are no agents that are not processes of 
interpretation.  To articulate these claims, we will first return to the self as it was 
discussed in Chapter II and we will attempt to round out our account of a unified, 
individual agent with help from the technical doctrine of interpretation as elaborated in 
Chapter III.  This will set us up for the transition into a discussion of communal agency 
as well as provide the necessary context for understanding why Royce would argue for 
the “reality of community,” the claim that communities themselves are possessed of a 
single, unified agency. 
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 Let us first emphasize the intersection of the process of interpretation and agency 
by looking at an expanded definition of the self: 
 When a process of conscious reflection goes on, a man may be said to interpret 
himself to himself. In this case, although but one personality, in the usual sense of 
the term, is in question, the relation is still really a triadic relation. And, in 
general, in such a case, the man who is said to be reflecting remembers some 
former promise or resolve of his own, or perhaps reads an old letter that he once 
wrote, or an entry in a diary. He then, at some present time, interprets this 
expression of his past self.1 
 
After our discussion of the Doctrine of Interpretation, we now know the technical sense 
of the word that Royce has in mind when he speaks of a present self “interpreting” a past 
self to a future self.  Any one given agent, as we usually use the term, is always actually 
three different selves, or three different agents, engaged in the process of interpretation 
across time.  And while our examination of this model of the self in Chapter II left us 
wondering what warrant we have for ascribing unity to any such series of temporally 
displaced interpreters, we now have the tools to explain this unity.  At any moment, the 
present self is the sign, the past self the object, and the future self the interpretant of the 
process of interpretation.  The present self binds the past and future selves by interpreting 
the past and addressing it to the future, and this entire process is unified throughout time.  
As we saw above, all selves (or signs) that play a part in a process of interpretation are 
preserved as they are interpreted, for a sign always brings its interpretant into relation 
with its object (past selves) in such a way that all previous signs exert influence over all 
subsequent signs and interpretants. Thus, on a formal level, an agent simply is a process 
of interpretation.  We ascribe unity to an individual agent on the basis of the fact that this 
particular agent has interpreted, currently interprets, and (presumably) will continue to 
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interpret itself to itself; that is, that this particular agent is a unified series of 
interpretation. 
 While this structure of agency is obviously the paradigm case for Royce, we 
might still wonder about non-triadic agents in the world.  Even if we have reasons for 
taking triadically-structured agency to be in some way ideal, surely this does not preclude 
the possibility of other forms of agency.  And yet, this preclusion is precisely a 
consequence of the Doctrine of Interpretation and the Doctrine of Signs as Peirce and 
Royce understood them. If a thing is knowable, it is knowable as something that 
determines an interpretant. But in order to determine an interpretant, it must be a sign, 
and therefore also part of a triadic process of interpretation.  If it is not knowable, 
however, then it must not be able to participate in the process of interpretation, for to 
speak about something is to offer an interpretation of it (and hence to find it already taken 
up by an interpretant), and so the very notion of an unknowable thing-in-itself is absurd. 
Additionally, Peirce’s famous “Reduction Thesis” states that all n-adic relations can be 
constructed from triadic relations, and so tetradic, pentadic, and all other n-adic relations 
reduce to triadic relations.2  The Problem of Christianity echoes both of these claims.  
Royce insists that the only meaningful sense of “reality” is that which is uncovered and 
which takes shape in the process of interpretation. 
If physical objects are especially to be viewed as objects which are or which can 
become objects of experience for various men, then whoever says, ‘I have 
discovered a physical fact,’ …is interpreting. […] By the ‘real world’ we mean 
simply the ‘true interpretation’ of this our problematic situation.3   
 
In fact, interpretation is utterly pervasive of reality on Royce’s view.4  In the chapter 
appropriately entitled “The World of Interpretation,” we find that “[The] dual antithesis 
between perceptual and conceptual knowledge is once for all inadequate to the wealth of 
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the facts of life. When you accomplish an act of comparison,” an act Royce takes to be an 
ever-present operation of consciousness, “the knowledge which you attain is neither 
merely conceptual, nor merely perceptual, nor…a synthesis of [the two]. It is a third type 
of knowledge. It interprets.”5 And in the following chapter, Royce summarizes his 
metaphysics in the following terms: “‘The universe consist[s] of real Signs and of their 
interpretation.’”6  Royce also endorses the Reduction Thesis, claiming that “you cannot 
express any complete process of interpreting by merely naming two terms…and by then 
telling what dyadic relation exists between one of these two and the other.”7  Hence, 
Royce rejects both the possibility of an inert agent lying outside all processes of 
interpretation and the possibility of a non-triadically structured agent. 
 
Purpose, Ideas, and the Process of Interpretation  
 The claim that an agent is a unified process of interpretation gives us the form, or 
the “how” of agency, as it were, but we miss the full sense of agency for Royce without a 
sense of what is carried forward in this form.  In Chapter II we saw how two crucial 
dimensions of agency, viz. ideas and the self, must be understood in terms of purpose.  
We must now pair this discussion of purposiveness with the form in which purposiveness 
occurs. 
 In Chapter III we addressed Royce’s appropriation of Peirce’s theory of signs and 
noted that, for Royce, individual agents can play the role of signs in the process of 
interpretation.  In fact, even a cursory glance at the latter chapters of The Problem of 
Christianity reveals that not only signs and individual agents, but also ideas are 
interchangeable vis-à-vis the process of interpretation.  
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The principle, then, relating to the value and to the truth of one’s acts of interior 
and conscious comparison, is that they express an insight which surveys, as from 
above, an unity wherein are combined various ideas. …[W]hatever the ideas may 
have been before they were compared,—as a result of the comparison of the two 
ideas, one of them is interpreted in light of the other.8   
 
Ideas, individual agents, and signs; these all amount to the same thing from the 
perspective of interpretation.  As “expressions of a mind,” they are all purposive aimings 
in and towards the world.  More importantly, if these terms are all various expressions of 
purposiveness, this means that what processes of interpretation carry forth is purpose. 
This is precisely what Royce means when he speaks of an agent as a process of 
interpretation that is “essentially ‘coherent,’ despite its endless novelties and unexpected 
incidents.”9  This coherence is another name for the unity that arises from being a process 
of interpretation, from being a unified plan of action.   
A note of clarification is in order regarding the self as a unified series of 
purpose(s).  Recall that as we saw in Chapter II, ideas are the partial embodiment of 
purposes, or plans of action.  They achieve correspondence with their object insofar as 
they manage to actively bring about the state of affairs at which they aim.  So there is 
such a thing as the achievement of purposes (plans of action may be carried out), and yet, 
as finite creatures, this achievement is always partial.  What, then, does it mean to speak 
of a unified series of partially fulfilled purposes as an agent?  The self, the will, and 
purposes are coextensive for Royce, and so in this sense our purposes or plans of action 
can be said to express our will.  However, we cannot ever “know, just now the whole of 
what this will of ours, in its present dissatisfaction, really intends and means…”10  
Indeed, Royce holds that one of the most difficult and consuming tasks in life “is to learn 
to have a will of my own. To learn your own will,—yes, to create your own will, is one 
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of the largest of…human undertakings.”11  So even while some finite purpose or plan of 
action can be fulfilled, this fulfillment is always partial because we never know entirely 
the will that it fulfills. Our ideas do indeed ask questions of the world, but, “a mere 
fragmentary mood of finite life,—if taken by itself, asks no very definite 
questions…[The] will expresses its purpose only in so far as it is now conscious of 
it[self].”12  Stated otherwise, we do receive answers to our purposive inquiries, and as 
members of the infinite series of interpretation, our plans of action do in fact interpret and 
shed light on the will that has proposed these inquiries.  But we only ever catch a glimpse 
of finite questions that guide these inquiries, where finite means failing to fully bring into 
view the ultimate purpose of all our inquiries.  The discovery of our will is something 
sought after and accomplished only in the infinite series of interpretations. This series is a 
purposive unity, so there is some ultimate purpose of which finite plans of action are the 
expression, but as creatures whose life does not coincide with the infinite series, our own 
will is never exhaustively uncovered to us. 
 To add to the complexity of a unified series of purpose, in addition to the limits of 
finitude, the unity described here depends in no way on similarity, harmony, or 
agreement between the various ideas/signs/selves that comprise a process of 
interpretation.  Royce held a deep appreciation for the extent to which we are internally 
conflicted individuals. The idea that we are the product of conflicting desires is arguably 
the principle motivating idea of his ethical work in The Philosophy of Loyalty.13  Viewing 
conflict across time, we can easily imagine a scenario in which we are committed to a 
cause at some point, which, some months or years later, we utterly abandon and even 
come to find reprehensible.  For Royce, even after we have changed our position on such 
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a cause, we still engage in the process of interpretation insofar as we interpret our past 
self to our future self by considering our past commitment and resolving not to return to 
it.14 
 So an agent for Royce is no more and no less than a unified process of 
interpretation.  The process of interpretation itself is said to be agential, or to be the 
structure of agency, for wherever one finds a process of interpretation, one also finds the 
purposiveness carried forth in it, which is precisely what agency consists in for Royce.  
Moreover, this triadic structure is said to be the form of all agency, for to speak of a non-
triadically structured form of agency is to offer an interpretation of it and to thereby bring 
it into a triadic relation.  As finite creatures, our purposes are never fully present or 
achieved, and members of a unified series may even be at odds.  Nevertheless, for Royce, 
this is the structure of agency.  Now we turn to our principal task: to bring this definition 
of agency to fruition in an explanation of communal agency. 
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CHAPTER V 
COMMUNAL AGENCY 
 
The Process of Interpretation as Community    
The claim that we have been working towards is that which explains what Royce 
calls the “reality” of community.  Agency for Royce is purposiveness, and purposiveness 
is always structured in the triadic form of the process of interpretation.  Individual agents, 
as we usually use the term, are agential not because they are possessed of any special 
property, and not because they are individuals, but because they instantiate the process of 
interpretation.  Communities, then, to the extent that they instantiate the same structure, 
are also agents.  This is not an argument from analogy, which would claim that 
communities are like individuals in that they engage in similar processes of 
interpretation, and if individuals are agential, communities must be as well.  This present 
argument is an argument from form, claiming that Communities of Interpretation are 
agential because they embody the very structure of agency.  We will first lay out this 
argument from form, seeing why both individuals and communities must be regarded as 
agents.  Next, we will examine Royce’s notions of Communities of Hope and 
Communities of Memory in their relation to the process of interpretation in order to flesh 
out what it means to speak of communities possessing unified agency. Finally, we will 
explore why rather than a rosy picture of harmonious communities, we miss a crucial 
dimension of Royce’s view of community if we fail to grasp its tragic insight.  
So far we have confined most of our examples to single agents, that is, single 
persons, or agents that we would usually call “individuals.”  We have argued that an 
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individual agent is a process of interpretation, but we must now push this analysis to its 
logical terminus.  As a triadic relation between three members, wherever one finds a 
process of interpretation, one finds not only agency, but also community. Recall that 
Royce calls the process of interpretation a “conversation.”  This process is “not a lonely 
enterprise. There is someone, in the realm of psychological happenings, who addresses 
someone. The one who addresses interprets some object to the one addressed.”1  Even in 
the case of a single person, the process of interpretation is itself a “social process.” 
An interpreter…deals with two different minds, neither of which he identifies 
with his own. His interpretation is a “third” or mediating idea. This “third” is 
aroused in the interpreter’s mind through signs which come to him from the mind 
that he interprets. He addresses this “third” to the mind to which he interprets the 
first. The psychology of the process of social interpretation, so far as that process 
goes on in the interpreter’s individual mind, is identical with that psychology of 
comparison which we have now outlined.2 
 
It’s in this sense, then, that for Royce, that the argument for communal agency is quite 
simple.  The process of interpretation is itself agential.  Whether this process is carried 
out on the scale of what we usually call an “individual” or on the scale of what we 
usually call a “community” is a mere difference in order of magnitude.  And despite our 
intuitions that individuals remain discrete regardless of the relations in which they stand 
to other individuals, the structure of agency as Royce understands it makes it so that 
agents just are communities, structured by the triadic process of interpretation. 
 
Communities of Memory and Communities of Hope 
We have made repeated emphasis on the temporally extended nature of agency.  
This is no accident: “[A] true community,” Royce insists, “is essentially a product of a 
time-process.”3  This time-process, “and the ideal extensions of the self in this time-
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process, lie at the basis of the whole theory of the community.”4 As one might expect, 
such “ideal extensions” stretch backwards and forwards in time in the form of 
Communities of Memory and Communities of Hope, respectively.  With our definition of 
agency fully developed in terms of the process of interpretation, we are in a position to 
explain why memory and hope accompany real community. 
Let us first bring to light a preliminary definition of both of these communities. 
Looking backwards in time, a Community of Memory is one “constituted by the fact that 
each of its members accepts as part of his own individual life and self the same past 
events that each of his fellow-members accepts…”5 In a Community of Memory, each 
individual member is able to say of at least some single past event, “‘That belongs to my 
life’”6  This is not in the sense of something personally witnessed by each member, but in 
the sense that the members of the Community of Memory as it now lives are inheritors of 
some common history, common “remembered experiences, deed, plans.”7  Looking 
forward in time, Royce defines a Community of Hope as one “constituted by the fact that 
each of its members accepts, as part of his own individual life and self, the same expected 
future events that each of his fellows accepts…”8 Members do so in such a way that “the 
community is a being that attempts to accomplish something in time and through the 
deeds of its members.”9  
In both cases, the existence of community requires that members possess some 
“ideal common past and future.”10  This is a consequence of the fact that all real 
communities (that is, communities that are agents) are Communities of Interpretation.  
A community, whether of memory or of hope, exists relatively to the past or 
future facts to which its several members stand in the common relation just 
defined. The concept of the community depends upon the interpretation which 
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each individual member gives to his own self,—to his own past,—and to this own 
future.11 
 
Communities of Memory and Communities of Hope, then, are various ways of speaking 
to the temporally extended nature of the unified process of interpretation that is a 
communal agent. Royce’s use of “accepts” in our preliminary definitions makes 
Communities of Memory and Communities of Hope sound accidental to Communities of 
Interpretation, but we should not let this throw us. In the paragraph preceding those 
definitions, Royce equates “accepts” with “interprets.” Viewed in light of being a 
Community of Interpretation, a Community of Memory simply conveys how any given 
(communal) agent at any point in time stands situated within the series of interpretation 
such that its members are constituted by a common history of interpretation (that is, 
Communities of Memory and Communities of Hope are entailed by the very structure of 
the process of interpretation).12 “The whole past history of civilization has resulted in that 
form and degree of interpretation of you and of my other fellow-men which I already 
possess, at any instant when I…interpret[] your life or your ideas.”13  In the same light, 
Communities of Hope are a way of addressing how members of a Community of 
Interpretation share a purpose as members of the same series of interpretation. This 
means that all members of the community, all members of the unified series, because 
they are all expressions of a unified purposiveness, share a common goal.  What the 
community attempts to accomplish through its members is just this purpose, and each 
member contributes in some way to this purpose’s fulfillment.  Just as individuals are a 
unified carrying forth and expression of purpose, so are communities. 
One notable upshot of Communities of Memory and Communities of Hope can be 
illustrated in concert with the trivalence claim we saw earlier. It’s difficult to reconcile 
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Royce’s highly simplistic and formal examples of triadic Communities of Interpretation 
with everyday experience, in which one does not often encounter a community of three 
making a concerted effort to unite their wills.  But the trivalence claim helps us see that 
the notion of Communities of Interpretation is not meant to be anything so removed from 
reality.  The aim is rather to help us see that Communities of Interpretation are the results 
and shapers of complex histories.  Indeed, their very being lies in the interpretive activity 
they carry out, the interpretive relations that constitute them. Recall that in Chapter III we 
saw that there is no ‘beginning’ to interpretation; to be of the nature of a sign is to have 
one’s existence in the activity of interpretation and to ultimately play all three roles of 
object, sign, and interpretant.  This point was not lost on Royce at the level of communal 
agency.  
Without essentially altering the nature of our community, our respective offices 
can be, at our pleasure, interchanged. You, or my other neighbor, can at any 
moment assume the function of interpreter; while I can pass to a new position in 
the new community. And yet, we three shall constitute as clearly as before a 
Community of Interpretation. The new community will be in a perfectly definite 
relation to the former one; and may grow out of it by a process as definite as is 
every form of conscious interpretation.14 
 
Not only do we stand in all three interpretive positions as a consequence of trivalence (as 
in the example of the Egyptologist), but even the same three members of a process of 
interpretation, given the ability to coexist over time such that it’s possible, may shift 
interpretive roles.  It is just as easy to imagine a professor interpreting a student to a 
teaching assistant as it is to imagine a teaching assistant interpreting a student to a 
professor (or a student doing the interpreting, as they frequently do when asking 
questions about a course). And of course, neither the professor, nor the student, nor the 
teacher are members of only this Community of Interpretation, but simultaneously stand 
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in myriad other interpretive relations with other agents (that is, each of them is a member 
of multiple Communities of Interpretation). Once again, the upshot is that Royce’s 
account is no empty formalism, but one that does great justice to the complex ways that a 
community folds and realigns to interpret itself to itself. 
 
Royce’s Tragic Insight 
 Our account of communal agency paints a comforting picture.  As members of a 
Community of Interpretation, we share a common history and a common purpose. We 
each may interpret one to the other, and, at some point in time, we will all pass through 
the same interpretive roles, but most importantly, we are a unified agent. Nevertheless, 
we miss a crucial dimension of Royce’s account if what we take away from it is peace of 
mind. 
We have seen that as Communities of Interpretation, we share a common memory 
and a common hope.  Royce’s story about this common hope, though, is more complex 
than it may initially seem.  What keeps us from splintering off is precisely this shared 
goal, but while we know that as a Community of Interpretation we share a common fate 
or purpose, part of the tragedy of finitude is not knowing what this common goal is.  As 
we saw in the last chapter, part of being finite means never having this goal fully 
articulate. 
One goal lies before us all, one event towards which we all direct our efforts when 
we take part in this interpretation. This ideal event is a goal, unattainable under 
human social conditions, but definable, as an ideal, in terms of the perfectly 
familiar experience which every successful comparison of ideas involves. It is a 
goal towards which we all may work together…15 
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This is the weight of Royce’s Community of Hope: we accept shared future events in the 
sense of affirming that we share some such common fate, goal, or ideal, that there is 
some common purpose or fate of which we are the expression. (We might call this a 
formal claim: it is of the structure of Communities of Interpretation that they aim at some 
common purpose.)  We do not, however, get the privilege of knowing what this common 
fate, goal, or ideal is, because finitude describes limits to the expression and clarity of 
what we as a communal agent will. (We might call this a claim about content: the content 
of this community’s shared purpose is something never fully explicit to us in time.)  This 
accords perfectly with what we noted above regarding dissent or conflict within a 
community.  The unity of the series of interpretation depends in no way on harmony or 
agreement between members, and so internecine struggle may take place over what ends 
a community pursues without any essential rupture to that community’s agency.16 
To be sure, we do uncover our will over time: “The ideal extension of the 
[communal] self gets a full and concrete meaning only by being actively expressed in the 
new deeds of each individual life.”17  Finite plans of action are brought to fruition, and as 
members of the infinite series, they do interpret and shed light on the community’s will. 
But this interpretation is never final, for even the results of a successfully executed plan 
of action must be reinterpreted and revised in future inquiry to future ends.   We know 
that we share a common fate, but we do not know what that fate is, for we must always 
formulate and carry out our plans of action from the standpoint of a “mere fragmentary 
mood of finite life.” 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
 
Purposive Communities of Interpretation 
Agency, for Royce, is at root a matter of purposiveness, a plan of action always 
partially fulfilled.  The structure of this purposiveness always bears the triadic form of the 
process of interpretation, with the consequence that the process progresses not as an 
infinite number of discrete additions, but as a unified series.  In both the case of an 
individual self interpreting a past self to a future self and in the case of a community 
interpreting its common memory to its common future, agency is always already a 
purposive, unified community, moving forward in time as a process of interpretation.  
This is why Royce was so confident that “there can arise, in…community, no problem 
regarding the one and the many…no question to which the definition of the community 
of interpretation will not at once furnish a perfectly precise answer.”1 Royce’s argument 
from form makes the difference between individuals and communities a matter of scale 
rather than a matter of kind, for wherever one finds the process of interpretation, one 
finds both agency and community.  
This argument from form brings with it the consequence that, because the unity of 
agency does not depend on similarity between members of a series, or between signs, 
internal dissent does not threaten unity, but simply marks disagreement over the content 
of a Community of Hope.  As we saw in the previous chapter, the Community of Hope is 
a formal claim for Royce, and a tragic one.  Since every agent is a temporally extended 
process of interpretation, every agent is both a Community of Memory and a Community 
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of hope (for to be members of the same series is share signs to which one is temporally 
consequent and antecedent).  Sharing membership in a community of interpretation, we 
know that we are bound to a common fate. However, as a finite will, we never have our 
purposes fully apparent to us, which guarantees that the content of our common fate is 
never fully revealed.  Royce fully affirms, then, that members disagree over the ultimate 
purpose towards which their interpretations aim. In full, the passage cited above reads:  
There can arise, in…community, no problem regarding the one and the many, the 
quest and the goal, the individual who approaches the goal by one path or 
another, no question to which the definition of the community of interpretation 
will not at once furnish a perfectly precise answer.2 
 
What he denies is that as co-members of a process of interpretation we can escape a 
common fate. 
 
The Reality of Community and Genuine Community 
 This view of community makes clear advances on the approaches to collective 
agency that we first examined in Chapter I. It offers us an account of why community is 
real, a theory of community that does not base its explanatory strategy on beliefs in the 
minds of individual members.  On the contrary, it shows that individuals can belong to a 
community without being aware of it, for as long as they participate in a process of 
interpretation with other individuals, they form a community. On the view presented 
here, the process of interpretation and community necessarily accompany agency.  This 
stands in stark contrast to previous readings of these concepts in Royce, on which they 
are understood to carry a normative weight (that is, previous readings understand these 
concepts as goals that can fail to be achieved).  Kegley constructs the criteria for 
‘genuine’ communities and individuals in terms of the achievement of interpretation and 
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the construction of Communities of Memory and Communities of Hope.  Individuals, for 
Kegley, learn to interpret only when they have “respect and regard for each self and idea 
involved,” when they “aim to unite selves…”3 Once individuals have learned to engage 
in this process, “Through [it], each of the individuals involved comes to share a common 
past and/or a common future, that is, it becomes a community of memory and/or a 
community of hope. As a temporal being, like the self, the community brings forth an 
embodied ideal…”4  Likewise, Smith tells us that “The community is actual when the 
process of interpretation leads two or more selves to recognize that a common element is 
part of their own individual pasts.”5  Failing this, we are left with an impoverished 
individual (but an individual, nonetheless): “[T]he individual finds himself, his plan, and 
ideal, in loyalty to the cause of goals that define the many communities to which he 
belongs…the lost self is the one who has no community to help in the discovery of his 
true self.”6  While elaborating a thorough new interpretation of these ideas would require 
separate treatment, the theory of communal agency presented above bears on previous 
research in significant ways that merit attention and that might indicate a path for future 
research on such themes. 
If the account being defended in this work is correct and agency entails being a 
process of interpretation, a community of memory, and a community of hope, then 
Royce’s account of community would seem descriptive rather than normative.  Given the 
preponderance of the normative reading of these terms in Royce, it falls upon the present 
account to suggest a novel interpretation of this normative weight.  In other words, if a 
community is by its nature engaged in the process of interpretation and is by its nature a 
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Community of Memory and a Community of Hope, why is it that Royce seems to think 
there are better and worse ways for a community to be organized?  
The answer is a simple one: the difference between individuals and communities 
that are “genuine” and those that are not is not a difference of whether they exhibit the 
process of interpretation, whether they recognize their common history, or whether they 
recognize that they share a common fate. The community-based metaphysics defended 
here precludes the possibility of an individual or a community that could fail to stand in 
interpretive relations to other agents or fail to have a common past and common future.  
If a community can fall short of achieving some goal, this falling short cannot be 
construed in terms of failing to interpret or failing to have a common past or future. The 
difference must rather be the manner of interpretation.  Indeed, Royce’s picture of 
genuine individuals and genuine communities is one in which agents who are aware of 
the interpretive relations they stand in can better fulfill them. In other words, the 
normative claim is that awareness of the interpretive processes or purposive relations we 
stand in can make us better interpreters (though the claim is not, of course, that an 
interpreter who is aware of such purposive relations must refer to them as “the process of 
interpretation”). Of the interpreters’ attitudes Kegley says the following: “[R]espect and 
regard for selves and ideas involves both self-respect and respect of others. Both are 
necessary if one is to risk openness to change, to error, that interpretation requires.”7  In 
fact, for reasons we have already seen, interpretation can take place in the absence of 
respect, but Kegley is correct to point out the way in which these attitudes facilitate 
interpretation.8  Royce tells us that insofar as an interpreter is “sincere and truth-loving in 
his purpose as interpreter,” he says to the co-members of his Community of 
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Interpretation, “I am discontent with my narrowness and with your estrangement. I seek 
unity with you [and a third co-member.] …Three of us, then, I seek to bring into the 
desired unity of interpretation.”9  By announcing his goal to himself, the interpreter 
communicates that he is aware of his purpose, that he explicitly intends carry out his role 
in the process of interpretation. 
Similarly, Communities of Memory and Communities of Hope gain their genuine 
form with an explicit awareness of the ways in which current purposes are constituted by 
a common past and destined for a common hope. The genuine individual, Royce tells us, 
“lives in the far-off past and future as well as in the present. It is, then, the ideally 
extended self that is worthy to belong to a significant community.”10  The recovery and 
study of the past, of the prior interpretive acts that constitute a present community of 
interpretation, are crucial for discovering the community’s will.  This is why Royce holds 
that “A community has a past and will have a future. Its more or less conscious history, 
real or ideal, is a part of its essence. A community requires for its existence a history…”11 
Having a past and future are attributes of community merely as a consequence of being a 
process of interpretation. But notice how Royce finishes the above sentence: “…and is 
greatly aided in its consciousness by a memory.”  The contrast between “history” and 
“memory” marks the significant difference between a community merely constituted by a 
common past and a community that strives to keep that past alive and present to itself.  
The preceding history of interpretations continue to constitute a present community 
whether or not it realizes that this is the case, but making the community’s history 
explicit offers the community a better understanding of its current purposes (just as we 
saw in Chapters IV and V).  We necessarily carry previous interpretations forth in our 
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present interpretive acts, and to fail to make explicit what we carry forth is to fail to 
discover what we presently will.  One needn’t look far for such examples.  The U.S. 
claims a lengthy history of anti-black racism and U.S. culture remains largely unaware of 
how the legacy of chattel slavery continues to pervade contemporary social structures.  
On the normative sense of Communities of Memory being built here, this ignorance is to 
be diagnosed as a lack of attention to how prior (racist) interpretive acts continue to 
inform contemporary purposes; that is, we fail to explicitly bring into view the extent to 
which what we will preserves the racist history leading up to it.  As for making explicit 
our common fate, we have already seen that making the content perfectly clear is 
impossible for finite agency.  Nevertheless, Royce thinks awareness that we share a 
common fate will encourage cooperative efforts between members.12  A member of a 
genuine Community of Hope believes, 
This ideal event is a goal, unattainable under human social conditions, but 
definable, as an ideal, in terms of the perfectly familiar experience which every 
successful comparison of ideas involves. It is a goal towards which we all may 
work together: you, when you give me the signs that I am to interpret; our 
neighbor, when he listens to my interpretation; I, when I devote myself to the 
task.13 
 
Fate and the Present 
If the above account is correct, then Royce provides us with good warrant for 
thinking of communities as unified agents.  In no mere metaphorical sense do community 
members speak of a unified subject “we.”  The nature of agency is such that it is always 
an intersubjective process, whether carried out at the level of what we call an 
“individual” or what we call a “community” (as we have seen, the line is blurred in the 
Roycean framework). As processes of interpretation, we are, in the current moment, a 
 59 
product of the history of interpretive acts that form our past.  We are common 
descendents of the histories that constitute us; we are destined to take up prior 
interpretive acts whether we are aware of them or not.  As co-members of a Community 
of Interpretation, we share a common fate.  The details of this fate are unknown, for the 
present reveals to us only a partial glimpse of our purposes, of what we will.  And yet, 
despite its tragic dimension, Royce’s message is no fatalism.  True enough, there is no 
hope of articulating our final purpose, nor do we receive a chance to escape our past.  But 
the temporal displacement of the process of interpretation ensures that it is our present 
interpretive acts, our current purposes, that always stand in a position of transformative 
power.  As creatures of the present, the task of interpretation is always upon us; we are 
responsible for clarifying our will as it has taken place thus far and for adjusting our 
future-oriented aims accordingly.  It is perhaps of some comfort, then, to know that we 
carry out this perpetual task not as lone individuals, but with the resources of our co-
members, as a unified Community of Interpretation. 
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shared normative expectations, but this approach falls prey to the same problems as 
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10 For a significantly abridged but ultimately helpful overview of this thread in Royce, 
see Trotter, On Royce, 16–18. For a more technical discussion, see Smith, “Purpose in 
American Philosophy,” 10-12. 
 
11 Royce, The World and the Individual, I: 24–25. 
 
12 Ibid., I: 325. 
 
13 The interpretation of ideas and purposiveness articulated here should be contrasted 
with that of Flower and Murphey in The History of Philosophy in America. Flower and 
Murphey make an erroneous distinction between the will and ideas in Royce, claiming 
that the attentive action of ideas is merely “a form of willing,” that is, one of many 
possible forms. Flower and Murphey’s failure to identify purposes with ideas and the will 
leads them to reconstruct the internal meaning of ideas as their "intension," the external 
meaning of ideas as their "reference," and to distinguish these aspects of ideas from an 
agent's purpose(s), which belong to the will and are therefore "extrinsic" to ideas 
themselves. In their account, the will is severed from ideas, which are made to be the 
mere instruments of the will’s purposes. In fact, ideas and the will are coextensive 
categories for Royce. Ideas are the posing and the partial fulfillment of purposes.  The 
will is nothing more than a plan of action, and that plan of action is embodied in ideas. 
The smuggling in of Fregean vocabulary is unhelpful, as Royce's view of internal and 
external meaning does not map felicitously onto the sense/reference distinction. Royce's 
point is that an idea's internal meaning is always already formulated with an eye to its 
external meaning, such that there is no capturing the idea's sense without specifying the 
idea's intended referent and the idea’s purport in picking out that referent.  Likewise, 
there is no way of giving the idea's external meaning without specifying in what way and 
for what purpose that referent is picked out by the idea's internal meaning. Flower and 
Murphey, A History of Philosophy in America, II: 713–716.  
 
14 Royce, The World and the Individual, I: 325. 
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22 Royce, The World and the Individual, I: 304. 
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ideas corresponds with its object. There is no purely external criterion of truth. …Every 
finite idea has to be judged by its own specific purpose.  Ideas are like tools. They are 
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adjustment to their end. To ask me which of two ideas is the more nearly true, is like 
asking me which of two tools is the better tool. The question is a sensible on if the 
purpose in mind is specific, but not otherwise.” Ibid., I: 308. 
 
25 Royce, Metaphysics, 68. 
 
26 While this discussion treats the theme of “ideas,” it should be noted that in this respect 
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the Dewey of Experience and Nature or Human Nature and Conduct), understanding 
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“impressing [of] form upon the wax of…present ideas,” and yet our ideas about the past 
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about present objects.  The same argument can be raised for more abstract entities like 
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model for idea/object relations. Royce, The World and the Individual, I: 314–315. 
 
28 Ibid., I: 323. 
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centrality of purposiveness to agency in general. 
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38 Ibid. 
 
39 Ibid. 
 
40 John E. Smith aptly captures Royce’s goal of unity across time: “Although Royce 
wanted to preserve the unity, identity, and individuality of the self, he did not follow the 
Cartesian line of thought. Royce was opposed to the doctrine of a “substantial ego” 
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the experience of any individual but is rather a time-spanning unity, an ideal that cannot 
be compressed, so to speak, into a single instant of experience because it is never fully 
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43 Ibid., 285. 
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46 See also Royce, The World and the Individual, II: 260–262. 
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48 Ibid., 22. 
 
49 Kegley has made much of this point in her discussions of the self in Royce.  See 
especially Kegley, Josiah Royce in Focus, 59–64.  For a discussion of the religious 
relevance of this view, see Oppenheim, Royce’s Mature Ethics, 68–70.  
 
50 Royce, The Philosophy of Loyalty, 79. 
 
51 Ibid. 
 
52 Ibid. 
 
53 Kegley puts a fine point on Royce’s approach to other minds: “Royce does not need to 
struggle, as do Descartes and Husserl, to explain how we know other minds. We are first 
with other selves and only later become differentiated, unique selves.” Kegley, “Josiah 
Royce on Self and Community,” 36.  See also Kegley, Josiah Royce in Focus, 40–43. 
 
54 Royce, Royce’s Logical Essays, 163. 
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56 Ibid., 167. 
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Chapter III 
 
1 Royce, The Problem of Christianity, 286. 
 
2 Ibid., 287. 
 
3 Ibid. 
 
4 Ibid. 
 
5 Ibid., 289–290. 
 
6 Royce, The World and the Individual, I: 25. 
 
7 Royce, The Problem of Christianity, 290. 
 
8 Ibid. 
 
9 Ibid. 
 
10 Ibid., 286. 
 
11 We have already seen a number of passages in The Problem of Christianity 
demonstrating such variance in vocabulary, but this trend holds in other works, as well.  
That Royce holds individuals and signs to be equally apt participants in interpretation is 
clearly shown in his logical essay “Mind,” where he tells us that “With reference to its 
object, i.e. to the sign, or to the mind whose sign this is, the interpretation is the reading 
or rendering of the meaning of this mind by another mind…In general, when an 
interpretation takes place, there is an act B wherein a mental process A is interpreted, 
read, or rendered to a third mind.” Royce, Royce’s Logical Essays, 157 (emphasis added). 
 
12 One makes such pronouncements on Peirce’s nebulous corpus with caution, but to my 
knowledge Peirce’s writings contain no reference to a Community of Interpretation 
comprised of three individual persons. In contrast, this is a paradigm case for Royce: “A 
Community of Interpretation consists of three persons, or groups of persons, who are its 
members. …We may first think of them as individual men.” Royce, War and Insurance, 
48.  
 
13 For a treatment of these equivalences, see Short, Peirce’s Theory of Signs, 30-34. 
 
14 The sign/person collapse is not the only notable difference in terminology. In his 
logical essay “Mind,” Royce tells us that all “objects of interpretation are signs.” By 
‘object’ Royce means any member of a process of interpretation. This is to be 
distinguished from Peirce’s more specialized use of the word and the threefold semiotic 
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distinction he draws between objects, signs, and interpretants, to be discussed at length 
below. Royce, Royce’s Logical Essays, 154.  See also note 22 below. 
 
15 All Peirce quotes taken from The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, vols 1-
6, ed. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss, 1931-1935; vols. 7-8, ed. A.W. Burks, 1958 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press).  All Peirce citations in this work come from 
Collected Papers and abide by the standard format of Peirce scholarship: the citation 
“2.303” designates paragraph 303 of volume 2. 
 
16 Royce, The Problem of Christianity, 276n5. 
 
17 See Short's brilliant overview of these changes in Peirce’s Theory of Signs, Chapter 2. 
 
18 “Significance is not a direct relation of sign to object; instead, the significance of a sign 
is to be found in the interpretant. The sign signifies its object only by being so interpreted 
(or later [in Peirce’s career]), being so interpretable). Significance, therefore, is a triadic 
relation…” Ibid. 
 
19 It is perhaps helpful to note that there are two ‘axes’ of mediation, as it were: (1) The 
interpretant’s mediation of the sign’s relation to the object and (2) the sign’s mediation of 
the interpretant’s relation to the object.  This is the meaning of the “in part” adverted to 
here.  For more on this point, see Ibid. 
 
20 All diagrams are taken from Sheriff, The Fate of Meaning, 60. 
 
21 Royce, War and Insurance, 44–45. 
 
22 Royce’s collapse of several Peirce’s distinctions is not a result of scholarly 
insouciance, but Royce’s concern to draw out the consequences of Peirce’s technical 
doctrine as it relates to his own philosophical project: “I have not here to deal, at any 
length, with Peirce’s development of this theory of Signs. His doctrine was, as you will 
recall, not at first stated as the basis for a metaphysical system, but simply as a part of a 
logical theory of categories. My own metaphysical use of Peirce’s doctrine of signs, in 
my account of the World of Interpretation…is largely independent of Peirce’s 
philosophy.” Royce, The Problem of Christianity, 344–345.  
 
23 Of course, since we know that as members of the infinitely iterative process of 
interpretation, A must be a sign for an interpretively prior object and C will become a 
sign for a future interpretant.  For explanatory purposes we are currently remaining 
within the single triadic Community of Interpretation that Royce offers us. 
 
24 In other words, the two ‘axes’ of mediation referred to in note 19 are present: (1) B 
mediates between A and C as the agent who brings C into business with A and (2) C 
mediates between A and B as the agent who interprets their connection.   
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25 Royce, The Problem of Christianity, 345. 
 
26 This mention of “one insight” is not best understood as an invocation of Royce’s 
infamous Absolute.  In the chapter preceding this quote, Royce tells us that in the process 
of interpretation, “insight” is another name for an interpretant, or a “third,” which “looks 
down upon ideas from above” and “unite[s] what was formerly estranged.” Being 
“spanned by one insight,” then, is another way of describing the preservation of all signs 
in a process of interpretation. Ibid., 307. 
 
27 Ibid., 340. 
 
28 Royce’s discussion of the infinite series’ unity in the Supplementary Essay to The 
World and the Individual also bears this out.  See esp. Royce, The World and the 
Individual, I: 527–535. 
 
29 Royce, The Problem of Christianity, 345. 
 
Chapter IV 
 
1 Ibid., 287. 
 
2 Peirce’s best known argument for this thesis is developed in his “The Logic of 
Relatives” (3.456). See also Robert Burch’s well-known proof of the Reduction Thesis in 
Burch, “Peirce’s Reduction Thesis.” 
 
3 Royce, The Problem of Christianity, 330, 337. 
 
4 Once again, the philosophy of Royce’s student Mary Whiton Calkins sheds valuable 
light on Royce’s own thought.  In a collection of “personal statements” compiled by 
George Herbert Palmer, Mary Whiton Calkins describes her own metaphysical position 
in the following terms: “[A]ll that is real is ultimately…personal, in nature.”  She then 
attributes the same position to Royce, who is said to “conceive[] the physical world as 
made up of selves of an extra-human type.” See Calkins, “The Philosophical Credo of an 
Absolutistic Personalist,” 203–204. 
 
5 Royce, The Problem of Christianity, 306. 
 
6 Ibid., 345. 
 
7 Ibid., 286. 
 
8 Ibid., 311–312. Peirce clearly held this position as well.  See the quotation from 5.311 
above on page 34. 
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9 Royce, Royce’s Logical Essays, 166. 
 
10 Royce, The World and the Individual, II: 155. 
 
11 Royce, The Philosophy of Loyalty, 16. 
 
12 Royce, The World and the Individual, II: 34. 
 
13 “By nature I am a victim of my ancestry, a mass of world-old passions and impulses, 
desiring and suffering in constantly new ways…Social training stimulates the will of the 
individual self, and also teaches this self customs and devices for self-expression. 
…Teach men customs, and you equip them with weapons for expressing their own 
personalities. […] Loyalty, then, fixes our attention upon some one cause, bids us look 
without ourselves to see what this unified cause is, shows us thus some one plan of 
action, and then says to us, ‘In this cause is your life, your will, your opportunity, your 
fulfillment.’” Royce, The Philosophy of Loyalty, 16–17, 21.  
 
14 As Royce might put it, even noting a drastic difference between two things also unites 
them: “By means of this ‘third’ you so compare a ‘first’ object with a ‘second’ as to make 
clear to yourself wherein consists the similarity and the difference between the second 
and first. Comparison must be triadic to be both explicit and complete.” Royce, The 
Problem of Christianity, 300. 
 
Chapter V 
 
1 Ibid., 289. 
 
2 Ibid., 312–313. 
 
3 Ibid., 243. 
 
4 Ibid., 268. 
 
5 Ibid., 248. 
 
6 Ibid. 
 
7 Ibid., 245. 
 
8 Ibid., 248. 
 
9 Ibid., 254. 
 
10 Ibid., 252. 
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11 Ibid., 248–249. 
 
12 Foust affirms that Communities of Memory and Communities of Hope entail one 
another, though he does not explore their necessary connection to Communities of 
Interpretation. “Of course, communities are communities both of memory and 
expectation or hope; the distinction is one merely of emphasis; a group founded upon the 
shared goal of honoring the memory of some person who has died might be called a 
community of memory with respect to their memory of this person, but they are also a 
community of hope with respect to their wish to see proper tribute paid to the person who 
they fondly remember.” See the chapter “Loyalty and Community” in Foust, Loyalty to 
Loyalty. 
 
13 Royce, The Problem of Christianity, 314. 
 
14 Ibid., 316. 
 
15 Ibid., 315. 
 
16 In fact, the process of interpretation can only be carried out with some difference 
between its members, for if they melded together there would be no “comparison” (or 
contrast) to be interpreted.  See Ibid., 267–268. 
 
17 Ibid., 268. 
 
Chapter VI 
 
1 Ibid., 316. 
 
2 Ibid., emphasis added. 
 
3 Kegley, Genuine Individuals and Genuine Communities, 44. 
 
4 Ibid., 45. 
 
5 Smith, Royce’s Social Infinite, 69. 
 
6 Smith, “The Contemporary Significance of Royce’s Theory of the Self,” 119. 
 
7 Kegley, Genuine Individuals and Genuine Communities, 44. 
 
8 Ibid., 42–44. 
 
9 Royce, The Problem of Christianity, 314. 
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10 Ibid., 255. 
 
11 Ibid., 243. 
 
12 And not just cooperative efforts, but loyalty.  An overview of how this account of 
communal agency intersects with Royce’s thought on loyalty and recent commentary on 
it would require separate treatment, but it merits mention that the account here 
corroborates readings of Royce’s theory of loyalty (and loyalty to loyalty) as articulating 
an ethics not just for individuals, but for communities as well. In The Philosophy of 
Loyalty, Royce defines loyalty as “the willing and practical and thoroughgoing devotion 
of a person to a cause.” Royce, The Philosophy of Loyalty, 9, 57.  Royce holds that 
loyalty is a good for all agents, and on this basis, the supreme principle of all ethical life 
is “Be loyal to loyalty,” or “so choose and so serve your individual cause as to secure 
thereby the greatest possible increase of loyalty among men.”  Taking Royce’s definition 
of loyalty as another way of addressing the purposive nature of the self, then on the 
account of agency defended here, a community is equally eligible for “willing and 
practical and thoroughgoing devotion” to a cause as an individual is, and equally 
responsible for selecting a cause that is loyal to loyalty.  Thus, the theory of communal 
agency articulated above may be taken to show the conditions of agency under which the 
ethical standard of loyalty to loyalty is binding on communities.  For more detailed 
treatments of what this entails, see Trotter, “Royce, Community, and Ethnicity” and also 
Foust, Loyalty to Loyalty, especially the chapter "Loyalty and Community." 
 
13 Royce, The Problem of Christianity, 315.  
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